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Abstract.
Two countries face a strategic interdependence in producing intermediate goods. Producing these in-
termediate goods requires both of domestic capital and another imported intermediate good. Individually
they determine its balanced growth path by taking into account this interdependence. By allowing for
strategic interactions in the analysis we adapted a two-agent dynamic setting and find an interior Markov
Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) as well as an open-loop equilibrium. We find that main results resemble each
other but growth rates will be higher when strategies are allowed to be revised dynamically.
JEL Classification System: C73, F15
1 INTRODUCTION
Interdependence among economies has increased due to globalization (Ventura, 1997; Jones,
2000). There exist many production and complementation agreements among multinational
firms conjointly to trade liberalization processes among countries. For instance, a considerable
part of the car production in any given economy requires importing spare parts and non locally
produced components. This way, the manufacturing in diverse economic sectors is internation-
ally complemented through local production and the importing of raw and intermediate inputs
from abroad. This has been already noted by (Sanyal and Jones, 1982) who conclude that the
majority of international trade is mainly composed by intermediate and raw goods which re-
quire local processing before reaching the final consumer. Trade agreements have fostered this
process and helped to firms in diverse economies to specify their production plans based on free
tariff inputs. In fact, local produced and foreign inputs usually compete in the domestic market
(Chen et al., 2004). In these highly integrated economies, the production of intermediate inputs
in one economy becomes crucial for production of final or intermediate goods in the associated
economy1.
We study a simple model of optimal economic growth in which two countries maintain an
interdependence relation in intermediate goods production. Each economy produces a final
good and an intermediate good that exports to its trade partner. Producing one unit of its own
capital requires a non domestically produced input (intermediate good) that is imported from
another economy. Both economies have liberated their middle product trade and intermediate
goods and services are available to both economies free of any commercial restriction. The
reasons for this trade liberalization can be associated to comparative advantages in production
cost or extraction or maybe the result of a political trade agreement previously signed2. We
assume that both economies acknowledge this mutual interdependence and plan its long-run
growth paths assuming this interdependence3.
We work with a two-economy model, where each economy is represented by an agent
that maximizes consumption by producing two types of goods: productive capital and an in-
termediate good. The production of intermediate goods has strategic considerations: each
economy requires intermediate goods from another economy to produce its own intermedi-
ate goods. The model is strongly based in (Dockner and Nishimura, 2004)’s analytical frame-
work. It also draws upon game-theoretic differential game literature (Zeeuw and van der Ploeg,
1991; Fischer and Mirman, 1996), and on literature intermediate good trade (Ventura, 1997;
Sanyal and Jones, 1982; Chen et al., 2004).
The main findings of the model are that equilibria exist under the open-loop and Markov
strategies. When the internalization of the effect is updated period to period, economies grow
faster. By internalizing the dependence of foreign intermediate products agents obtain greater
rates of growth. For this to be observed, each economy must have an own technology of inter-
1 As suggested earlier, many complementarities emerge from free trade agreements, and car industry is one
clear example. For instance, the Mercosur treaty has imposed a reduction in tariffs among main car producers
in member countries and the production of car parts is currently highly complementary. It is also observed in
domestic personal computer production and assembling where each component often have different production
origin. Finally, another example is the aircraft industry in Europe where parts or even complete sections of a
fuselage are produced in several countries and assembled in one common factory.
2 Other contributions named this process as strategic outsourcing (Chen et al., 2004).
3 Another model of optimal growth and trade is (Ventura, 1997). However, he relies in a Ramsey model
with trade that includes no strategic interactions and he focus on the international interdependence in the middle
products sector and its influence in the growth process. (Peng et al., 2006) also model a two-economy (or region)
model focus on the population agglomeration effects and differential wage incidence on growth and trade.
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mediate goods production with strictly decreasing returns to scale.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and definitions. Section
3 presents the results in the strategic growth model and its main outcomes. Section 4 ends the
paper with the conclusions.
2 THE MODEL
Consider two economies, each of which is represented by a single agent indexed by i 6= j,
that accumulates productive capital and produces intermediate products through capital invest-
ment and input imports and derives utility from consumption4. Each country tries to maximize
economic growth observing this mutual interdependence. Output of one country’s middle prod-
ucts no only depends on its capital stock and labor but also on the use of intermediate goods
from the other country. Thus, each country faces an externality in its capital stock depending of
the adopted behavior of the other economy.
The structure of the model is as follows. Let Kit , Z
i
t , Y
i
t , and C
i
t be the productive capital
stock, intermediate-goods stock, output, and consumption of agent i in period t, respectively.
For simplicity, we assume that total labor used in each country is constant and given by Li. The
production function of agent i is Y it = pii (K
i
t)
αi (Zit)
βi (Li)
1−αi−βi where pii > 0 is a total factor
productivity index. We assume that the level of Zit = f
(
Kit , Z
j
t
)
, with j 6= i, in a formulation
of the type:
Zit =
(
Kit
Li
) ςi
βi
(
Zjt
Lj
)ϕj
βi
Li (1)
where ςi + ϕj = βi < 1. This function expresses that intermediate goods Zit are produced
as a combination of the stock of productive capital of economy i, Kit , and intermediate inputs
from the economy j, Zjt .
Assuming constant rates of depreciation for both types of stock of capital, δ and χ respec-
tively, and applying the income identity, i.e., output in the current period is used for consumption
and investment, results in the following accumulation equation
Y it = pii
(
K it
)αi (Zit)βi (Li)1−αi−βi − Cit − (1− δ)K it − (1− χ)Zit
If we redefine variables in terms of units per labor employed, i.e., kit ≡ K it/Li, zit ≡ Zit/Li,
cit ≡ C it/Li, and assume that there is full depreciation, δ and χ, we obtain the following
kit+1 = pii
(
kit
)αi (zit)βi − cit (2)
The accumulation equation (2) gives rise to a model of strategic growth in which agents
recognize that their respective capital stocks do influence each others and gives rise so that this
is internalized emerging a strategic externality. The initial state dynamics is represented by
kit+1 = pii (k
i
t)
αi (zit)
βi − cit. But for (1) we have that zit ≡ Zi/Li ≡ (kit)
ςi
βi
(
zjt
)ϕj
βi , and then
replacing we obtain kit+1 = pii (k
i
t)
αi (kit)
ςi
(
zjt
)ϕi − cit this way, in case the interaction is fully
internalized by the two agents the state dynamics becomes
kit+1 = pii
(
kit
)αi+ςi (zjt )ϕj − cit (3)
4 The model could also be interpreted as a two-region one, with different agents in each region.
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and the resulting model can either be formulated as an open-loop (precommitment) or a
Markov game without commitment (closed-loop)5. In case agents play a game in which they
have access to Markov strategies they design their current actions as decision rules that depend
on the current stocks of both countries summarized in the defense parity parameter θ, while in
the case of an open-loop game agents choose their strategies as simple time paths that do not
depend on the current level of the capital stocks.
We assume that the production function, yit = pii (k
i
t)
αi+ςi
(
zjt
)ϕj , satisfies the following
parameter restrictions: pii is strictly positive and constant and 0 < αi, ςi, ϕj < 1 and αi+ςi+ϕj1.
Each agent derives utility in period t only from current consumption and the utility function,
ui (cit) is logarithmic, i.e. u
i (cti) = ln c
i
t. Each agent lives forever, i.e. T = ∞, and maximizes
the discounted stream of utility with the discount rate given by ρ = (1/(1 + r)), where r is the
rate of interest satisfying r > 0. We consider only domestic consumption in this model. Finally,
we assume that trade balance is always in equilibrium and does not require any capital flows
compensation.
Each agent maximizes the discounted stream of utility given by
J i =
∞∑
i=0
ρi ln cit,
subject to
kit+1 = pii
(
kit
)αi+ςi (zjt )ϕj − cit
and given initial conditions
(
ki0, z
j
0
)
.
Specifically, this strategic growth game in reduced form looks as follows:
max
{kit+1}∞t=0
{
J i =
∞∑
t=0
ρt ln
(
pii
(
kit
)αi+ςi (zjt )ϕj − kit+1)
}
(4)
subject to the initial conditions
(
ki0, z
j
0
)
.
We follow with the derivation of equilibria of the two postulated models.
3 STRATEGIC GROWTH GAME EQUILIBRIA
We mentioned earlier that we have two possible equilibrium strategies for the agents. The
first one that we are going to analyze is the open-loop solution that requires that agents commit
to some initial strategy of capital augmentation during the complete period of analysis. En
the second, agents used Markov strategies that reconsider in each period of time their strategy
during the complete period of analysis.
3.1 The open-loop game
In open-loop games agents choose their consumption as simple time paths and commit them-
selves to stick to these time profiles during the entire game. It is clear that such a game cannot
capture all the strategic interactions present in the dynamic game. It resembles many features
of a one shot game and the equilibrium optimum could be analyzed as the Nash equilibrium of
this game.
5 Readers interested in this concept of solutions should consult (Dockner et al., 2000) for the differential games
case and (Zeeuw and van der Ploeg, 1991) for the difference games case.
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To characterize the open-loop equilibrium we apply the first order conditions, which are also
sufficient given strict concavity, and get
−1
pii (kit)
αi+ςi
(
zjt
)ϕj − kit+1 + ρpii (αi + ςi)
(
kit+1
)αi+ςi−1 (zjt+1)ϕj
pii
(
kit+1
)αi+ςi (zjt+1)ϕj − kit+2 = 0 (5)
Rearranging terms and dividing (5) by
(
kit+1
)αi+ςi (zjt+1)ϕj we obtain
pii + ραipii − ραipi2i
(kit)
αi+ςi
(
zjt
)ϕj
kt+1
− k
i
t+2(
kit+1
)αi+ςi (zjt+1)ϕj = 0
Now we create a variable xit+1 =
kit+1
(kit)
αi+ςi(zjt )
ϕj
and we replace in the FOC and we get the
dynamic equation:
pii + ραipii − ραipi2i
1
xt+1
− xit+2 = 0 (6)
Any growth process is governed by the dynamical system (6).
Lemma 1 The followings results hold: There exists an open-loop equilibrium of the strategic
growth model that results in consumption rules given by
ci
(
kit, z
j
t
)
= (1− αiρ)pii
(
kit
)αi+ςi (zjt )ϕj (7)
Departing from initial stocks
(
ki0, z
j
0
)
, equilibrium dynamics is governed by
kit+1 = ωi
(
kit
)αi+ςi (zjt )ϕj (8)
kjt+1 = ωj
(
kit
)αi+ςi (zjt )ϕj (9)
where ωi = (αi + ςi) ρpii and ωj = (αj + ςj) ρpij .
Proof: See Appendix.
The system develops governed by (8) and (9). For characterizing the system we propose the
following theorem.
Lemma 2 In case there are decreasing returns to scale, i.e. αi + ςi + ϕj < 1, equilibrium
dynamics admit a unique and stable steady state given by
(
k¯i0, z¯
j
0
)
=
(
[(ωi)]
1−αj−ςj
Φ [ωj]
ϕj
Φ , [ωi]
1−αi−ςi
Φ [ωj]
ϕj
Φ
)
(10)
where Φ = (1− αi − ςi) (1− αj − ςj)− ϕiϕj
Proof: See Appendix.
The case of decreasing returns of scale leads results directly interpretable. The case of con-
stant returns to scale follows as another interesting case for analysis.
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Lemma 3 Assume that the technologies exhibit constant returns to scale, that is, αi+ςi+ϕj = 1
and that pii is chosen in a way that pii (αi + ςi) ρ > 1 and pij (αj + ςj) ρ > 1 is verified. Then it
verifies that there exists a balanced growth path factor given by
ι = [ωi]
ϕj
ϕi+ϕj [ωj]
ϕi
ϕi+ϕj (11)
where ωi = pii (αi + ςi) ρ, ∀i, j.
Proof: See Appendix.
These results also resemble the AK-model. For instances, if both countries begin with the
same initial capital stocks, then the equilibrium dynamics is represented by:
kt+1 = ω (kt)
α+ς+ϕ
but if the available technology shows constant returns to scale we observe that the dynamics
of balanced-growth path is represented by
kt+1 = ωkt = Akt,
more familiarly known as a type of AK-growth model.
3.2 The closed-loop or Markov game
We follow with the derivation of a Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) of the strategic growth
model. A MPE is a Markov Nash Equilibrium that is at the same time a subgame perfect
equilibrium (SPE). The issue of existence of MPE for difference games is not an easy test. This
approach resembles many features of a repeated game where agents can revise their strategies
and the equilibrium optimum could be analyzed as the subgame perfect equilibrium of this
game.
Lemma 4 The following results hold: A MPE equilibrium exists to the strategic growth game
that results in consumption rules given by
ci
(
kit, z
j
t
)
=
(
1− ρ
(
(αi + ςi) +
ρϕiϕj
1− (αi + ςi) ρ
))
pii
(
kit
)αi+ςi (zjt )ϕj (12)
Departing from initial stocks
(
ki0, z
j
0
)
, equilibrium dynamics is governed by
kit+1 = ψi
(
kit
)αi+ςi (zjt )ϕj (13)
kjt+1 = ψj
(
kjt
)αj+ςj (
zit
)ϕi (14)
for i 6= j, where
ψi = pii
(
(αi + ςi) ρ+ ρ
2 ϕiϕj
1−(αi+ςi)ρ
)
and ψj = pij
(
(αj + ςj) ρ+ ρ
2 ϕiϕj
1−(αj+ςj)ρ
)
.
In case there are decreasing returns to scale, i.e. αi + ςi + ϕj < 1, equilibrium dynamics
admit a unique steady state given by
(
k¯i0, z¯
j
0
)
=
(
[ψi]
1−αj−ςj
Φ [ψj]
ϕi
Φ , [ψj]
1−αi−ςi
Φ [ψi]
ϕj
Φ
)
(15)
where Φ = (1− αi − ςi) (1− αj − ςj)− ϕiϕj
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In case of constant returns to scale, i.e. αi + βi + νj = 1, there exists a balanced growth
path with the growth factor given by
ϑ = ψ
ϕj
ϕi+ϕj
i ψ
ϕi
ϕi+ϕj
j (16)
Proof: See Appendix.
Next section is dedicated to analyze the results of both games.
4 ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
Qualitatively, the results of both models resemble each other. The main differences arise
when comparing the rate of growth. For instance, in the derivation process of the economies’
rates of growth we obtained, as (Dockner and Nishimura, 2004) did, that ψ > ω, i.e., the rate of
growth of the economy in the case of the Markov game is higher than in the case of open-loop
strategies. It seems that not only by internalizing but for dynamically reviewing the optimality
of the investment decision at each time step requires a higher rate of economic growth.
Inputs and domestic capital produce the exportable intermediate good under decreasing scale
returns. While this is consistent with the structure of the model, empirical evidence shows that
international intermediate goods usually embody increasing scale returns associated with tech-
nological improvements (Ciccone, 2002). This is an issue that deserves further improvements.
Summarizing, we study a simple optimum economic growth model where agents interact in
producing mutually traded intermediate goods. We apply a technique that take into account the
mutual interdependence in a dynamic framework. The dynamics of interaction is focused in a
direct response in present time. We confirm that economies growth faster when representative
agents are able to update their dynamic growth path. As other contributions show, integration
enhances economic growth.
5 APPENDIX
Following demonstrations are adapted from (Dockner and Nishimura, 2004).
Proof of Lemma 1 The dynamical system (6) has two negative steady states given by
xˆi = (αi + ςi) ρpii,
x˜i = pii
Since x˜i = pii implies zero consumption it is not an interesting equilibrium, since consump-
tion becomes null. Even more, it is easy to show that xˆi = (αi + ςi) ρpii, is unstable. Now, we
employ the transversality condition to derive an equilibrium.
lim
t→∞
ρt+1
∂ ln
(
pii (k
i
t)
αi+ςi
(
zjt
)ϕj − kit+1)
∂kit+1
kit+1 = 0
Where we follow that
ρt+1
∂ ln
(
pii (k
i
t)
αi+ςi
(
zjt
)ϕj − kit+1)
∂kit+1
kit+1 =
−ρt+1kit+1
pii (kit)
αi+ςi
(
zjt
)ϕj − kit+1
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and the transversality condition becomes
lim
t→∞
ρt+1
xit+1
pii − xit+1
= 0,
and it is satisfied if xit+1 is bounded away from pii. However, since xˆ
i is unstable, the path
which does not start from xˆi converges to zero or to pii. Since this last result makes consump-
tion goes to zero, we look forward for the path converging to zero. From (6) any path {xit}
converging to pii is monotone and satisfies
xit+1
pii − xit+1
=
xit+1
ρ (αi + ςi)pii
(
xit
pii − xit
)
Iterating we obtain
ρt+1
xit+1
pii − xit+1
=
xit+1x
i
t · · · xi1
((αi + ςi)pii)
t+1
(
xi0
pii − xi0
)
As xit+1 → pii the right hand side goes to infinity. Therefore, a path violates the transversality
condition. The other possible solution, the steady state xˆi = (αi − ςi) ρpii do not violate the
transversality condition and hence it corresponds to an equilibrium path. This steady state
results in the following optimum dynamics
kit+1 = (αi + ςi) ρpii
(
kit
)αi+ςi (zjt )ϕj
which implies, by (2), a consumption function equal to
ci
(
kit, z
j
t
)
= pii
(
kit
)αi+ςi (zjt )ϕj − (αi + ςi) ρpii (kit)αi+ςi (zjt )ϕj
ci
(
kit, z
j
t
)
= (1− (αi + ςi) ρ)pii
(
kit
)αi+ςi (zjt )ϕj
Proof of Lemma 2 We begin for defining the Jacobian of the dynamical system for analyzing
the characteristic equation. This would be the first step for dealing with the existence of a steady
state in this system.
[
αi + ςi ϕipii (αi + ςi) ρ
1−αi−ςi−ϕi
Φ pij (αj + ςj) ρ
αi+ςi+ϕi−1
Φ
ϕjpii (αi + ςi) ρ
αi+ςi+ϕi
Φ pij (αj + ςj) ρ
1−αi−ςi−ϕi
Φ αj + ςj
]
where Φ = (1− αi − ςi) (1− αj − ςj)− ϕiϕj.
By getting the characteristic equation of this system we obtain
f (λ) = λ2 − (αi + ςi + αj + ςj)λ+ ((αi + ςi) (αj + ςj))− ϕiϕj
Roots are real and we have that
f (1) = (1− αi − ςi) (1− αj − ςj)− ϕiϕj > ϕiϕj − ϕiϕj = 0
and
f (−1) = (1− αi − ςi) (1− αj − ςj)− ϕiϕj > 0
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The function is strictly convex since f ′′ = 2 > 0 and its minimum is at (αi + ςi + αj + ςj)/2 <
1 existing two roots, λi, i = 1, 2, such that |λi| < 1. Both roots are positive if (αi + ςi) (αj + ςj) >
ϕiϕj; one is positive and the other is negative if (αi + ςi) (αj + ςj) < ϕiϕj.
¤
Proof of Lemma 3 Assume that the technologies exhibit constant returns to scale, that is, αi+
ςi + ϕj = 1 and that pii is chosen in a way that pii (αi + ςi) ρ > 1 and pij (αj + ςj) ρ > 1 is
verified.
We get the following result:
The rate of growth for the economy in the open-loop case is giving by
ι = [(pii (αi + ςi) ρ)]
ϕj
ϕi+ϕj [pij ((αj + ςj) ρ)]
ϕi
ϕi+ϕj
Proof
Assuming that
kit = ι
tki0 and k
j
t = ι
tkj0 (17)
is verified. Then we get that kjt
/
kit = k
i
t
/
kjt . Substituting (17) in (8) we get that
ιt+1ki0 = ((αi + ςi) ρpii) ι
tϕiιt(αi+ςi)
(
ki0
)αi+ςi (kj0)ϕi
ιt+1ki0 = ((αi + ςi) ρpii)
(
ki0
)αi+ςi−1 (kj0)ϕi
ι = ((αi + ςi) ρpii)
(
kj0
ki0
)ϕi
An identical argument states that
ι = ((αj + ςj) ρpij)
(
ki0
kj0
)ϕj
By joining both results we obtain
ι =
[
pi
((αi+ςi)ρpii)
i
] ϕj
ϕi+ϕj
[
pi
((αj+ςj)ρpij)
j
] ϕi
ϕi+ϕj
¤
Proof of Lemma 4 Employing Markovian decision rules means that representative agents choose
strategies of the type cit = c
i
(
kit, z
j
t
)
when designing their actions. In order to derive a Marko-
vian Perfect Equilibrium we therefore make use of dynamic programming techniques. Let us
define the value function for agent i as
V i
(
kit, z
j
t
) ≡ max ∞∑
s=t
ρs ln cis (18)
These value functions must satisfy the Bellman equations
V i
(
kit, z
j
t
) ≡ max
ci
{
ln ci + ρV i
(
pii
(
kit
)αi+ςi (zjt )ϕj − ci, pij (kjt )αj+ςj (zit)ϕi − cj)} . (19)
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By following (Dockner and Nishimura, 2004) and (Fischer and Mirman, 1996), we guess a
candidate solution for the value function of the type:
V i
(
kit, z
j
t
) ≡ Aii ln(pii (kit)αi+ςi (zjt )ϕj)+Bij ln(pij (kjt )αj+ςj (zit)ϕi)+Di (20)
where Aii, Bij and Di are appropriately chosen constants. Based on these value functions
we can guess a policy function for the consumption strategy of agent i by
ci
(
kit, z
j
t
)
= ai
(
kit
)αi+ςi (zjt )ϕj (21)
where ai , in the same way, needs to be determined from the equilibrium conditions. Taking
under consideration these specifications of the policy functions the corresponding dynamical
system of the capital stock becomes
kit+1 = (pii − ai)
(
kit
)αi+ςi (zjt )ϕj (22)
If we now substitute the policy functions (21) and the proposed value functions (20) into the
Bellman equation (19) we get
Aii ln
(
(kit)
αi+ςi
(
zjt
)ϕj)
+Bij ln
((
kjt
)αj+ςj
(zit)
ϕi
)
+Di = ln
(
ai (k
i
t)
αi+ςi
(
zjt
)ϕj)
+
+ρ
[
Aii ln
(
pii (k
i
t)
αi+ςi
(
zjt
)ϕj − ai (kit)αi+ςi (zjt )ϕj)]
+ρ
[
Bij ln
(
pij
(
kjt
)αj+ςj
(zit)
ϕi − ai
(
kjt
)αj+ςj
(zit)
ϕi
)
+Di
]
where we see that if the constants Aii and Bij satisfy the equations
Aii = 1 + ρ [(αi + ςi)Aii + ϕjBij] (23)
Bij = ρ [ϕiAii + (αj + ςj)Bij] (24)
Then (20) and (21) solve (19). A solution to the system (23) and (24) is easily found and
given by
Aii =
1− (αj + ςj) ρ
(1− (αi + ςi) ρ) (1− ρ)− ρ2ϕjϕi (25)
Bij =
ϕjρ
(1− (αi + ςi) ρ) (1− ρ)− ρ2ϕiϕj (26)
for i 6= j
Proving that the policy function (21) is in fact an equilibrium we need to show that the
maximum of the right hand side of (19) given the specification (20).
The maximization gives:
1
ci
=
ρ ((αi + ςi)Aii + ϕiBij)
pii
(
kjt
)αj+ςj
(zit)
ϕi − ci
Solving for the optimal policy rule shows that the functional form given by (17) is attended,
by using Aii and Bij as obtained earlier, i.e.,
10
ci
(
ki, zjt
)
=
pii
(
kjt
)αj+ςj
(zit)
ϕi
1 + ρ ((αi + ςi)Aii + ϕiBj)
= ai
(
kjt
)αj+ςj (
zit
)ϕi
where ai = pii/1 + ρ ((αi + ςi)Aii + ϕiBj) . Hence, the equilibrium dynamics becomes
kit+1 = ψi
(
kit
)αi+ςi (zjt )ϕj (27)
kjt+1 = ψj
(
kjt
)αj+ςj (
zit
)ϕi (28)
for i 6= j, where
ψi = pii
(
(αi + ςi) ρ+ ρ
2 ϕiϕj
1−(αi+ςi)ρ
)
and ψj = pij
(
(αj + ςj) ρ+ ρ
2 ϕiϕj
1−(αj+ςj)ρ
)
In case of constant returns to scale, the balanced growth path with the growth factor given
by
ϑ = ψ
ϕi
ϕi+ϕj
i ψ
ϕj
ϕi+ϕj
j
¤
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